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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I . 
THE STOCK SUBSCRIPTION, DIRECT LOAN, AND 
GRANT FEATURES OF THE UTIA VIOLATE ARTICLE 
VI f SECTION 29 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Respondents1 ins is tence tha t t h i s dispute involves only 
a policy disagreement i s a t the bottom of t he i r argument. I t i s 
also e r r o r . Policy i s the domain of the Legis la ture so long as 
the Legis la ture ac t s within cons t i tu t iona l bounds. Heref the 
Legis la ture has exceeded i t s cons t i tu t iona l bounds. The 
Consti tution commands tha t "the Legis la ture shal l not authorize 
the Sta te . . . to lend i t s c red i t QJL subscribe to stock or bonds 
in aid of any . . . p r iva te . . . en t e rp r i s e . " (emphasis 
suppl ied) . In the UTIA, for the f i r s t time in our S t a t e ' s 
h i s to ry , the Legis la ture has authorized the State to lend i t s 
c red i t and to subscribe to stock in di rect aid of pr iva te s t a r t -
up, h igh-r isk fo r -p ro f i t corporat ions . 
And tha t i s what i s wrong with the UTIA. The defect i s 
not in i t s policy but in i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y . UTFC's asser t ion 
tha t the Const i tut ion draws a d i s t i nc t ion between lending money 
to a propr ie tary en te rpr i se on the one hand, and giving i t money 
or subscribing to i t s stock on the other , i s re jected by the 
p la in language of Ar t i c le VI, Section 29, by i t s h i s to ry , and by 
t h i s Court ' s decisions which have in te rpre ted i t . 
- 1 -
A. The Plain Const i tut ional Language 
The Respondents' argument t h a t Section 29 p roh ib i t s 
only loans and not stock subscr ip t ions i s nothing l e s s than a 
request t h a t the Court consider only half of the Sec t ion ' s 
language and ignore the r e s t . To be sure f Section 29 prohib i t s 
lending the S t a t e ' s c r e d i t . 1 But t ha t i s not a l l i t p roh ib i t s . 
I t also withholds from the Legis la ture the power to authorize the 
Sta te to "subscribe to stock . . . in aid of any . . . p r iva te . 
. . e n t e r p r i s e . " The language i s p la in and the p la in language 
con t ro l s . The stock subscr ipt ion feature of the UTIA i s 
unconst i tu t ional because i t authorizes precisely what Section 29 
by i t s terms forbids . 
UTFC a s s e r t s t h a t Appel lant ' s argument would divest the 
S ta te Treasurer of power to invest under U.C.A., 1953r § 51-7-11 
(Supp. 1985). That i s not t r u e . Investment by the Sta te 
T rea su re r under U.C.A., 1953, §§ 51-7-11(3)(c) and ( j ) f in 
highly rated commercial paper having a maturity of 180 days or 
l e s s or in shares of a reg i s te red management investment company 
"the por t fo l io of which i s r e s t r i c t e d by law or agreement to 
investments in which publ ic funds may be invested d i r ec t ly" 
1
 Lending of c r ed i t overlaps subscr ipt ion to stock f and i t 
appl ies .a f o r t i o r i to g ran t s . If the S t a t e ' s f inancia l 
resources cannot be l e n t , surely they cannot be given. Among 
fac t s relevant to the grants are these: 1) Recipients of the 
grants are se lec ted , fo r -p ro f i t business ventures of a narrow 
c l a s s , 2) Results of the grants are not public domain; though 
research reports may be madef ownership r igh t s would remain with 
the rec ip ien t corporat ions . (R. UTFC act ion 435; Undisputed 
Facts , Appendix D of Appel lant ' s opening brief f paragraphs 22 and 
23) , 3) Since new high-technology business ventures are 
i n t r i n s i c a l l y r isky, any return to the s t a t e from the business 
a c t i v i t i e s of the grantees would be conjectura l . 
- 2 -
(§ 5 1 - 7 - 1 1 (3) f •))) i r q u i t e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h S e c t i o n 29 as 
c o n s t r u e d by tho Cour t and u n d e r s t o o d h\ A p p e l l a n t , I t i s w i t h i n 
t h e haven of s a l e iy , - nun-Mil" * i s e i i u e - o f - a i d " b < -
p r i v a t e - e n t e r p r i s e a l lowed t i - ; ; , J t a h S t a t e Land Board 
^jL^L^-JaLtajcS-Fimnce Commissionr % ,.,+ c.:. .. : :6* , 3 6 5 >>.2.i -~ 
(1961) Cdlscusseo, at ivjip• - , <• ** 
b r i e f ) UTFC's p r o p o s e d p u r c h a s e M a :,a^. - i i i t - . ^^ . , x M s : ^ : 
i i i a v e n t u r e fund t h a t has r* • •- - . i <-*•-. •- n a r i c e t ,
 4 t : , u t . . i c 
moneys t h a t wil 1 Uien bo use . • • • 
i n s t a r t - u p , h i g h - t e c h b u s i n e s s v e n t u r e s i a id . j t i c a ^ i ^ 
c 'f ' * u i t h e " r a t ? o r e ^ i t r and a 
s u b s c r i b i n o t . r ., *,
 4 r i I v a t e e.\ » . . a. 
Whe^ • .v i"*r:;. ; , v e ? : s in e s t a b l i s h e c s e c ^ r ' i l e r " *- -* ~ 
i L. ^ . - ' ' ,• ^ 1 " i m o t h e r 
i n v e s t e *ne ^a^e . •_.< p roposed venti-i*- . .;/u _ 
UTIAf -h^ S t a ^ . ' - ••• P - i. , ; ] — £ : d ; h e o - ^ * * hands 
i n v e s t i n g i . : .. r t a M i s h e ; ; secure t i e / de t^ *• i r a v e n e n ^ , ^ ^ . n 
l a n a u a a e of t h o C o n s t i t u t i o n . . - * " - u b = c r i f p t i c n 
s tocL , "" if e r e
 r a; i iln> Ber ry . . •*. -
const : : m* iona3 p r o v i s i o n cannot rx iMr i^ \u ' t . ' o v . Ln u .v s t a t u t e . ' 
i '—i v . Beech A i r c r a f t Corp , , ^
 w ^ : . ~ u . . . . ^ _ _ . _ 
^ A t i i o :J * • awaru 1 . Aiuei Appendix E of A p p e l l a n t ' s o p e n i n g 
b r i e f . 
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B. The Clear History of Section 29 
The c l a r i t y with which the cons t i tu t iona l h is tory 
inveighs against the high-r isk stock a c q u i s i t i o n and d i r ec t 
loan f and grant fea tures of the UTIA has been shown in 
Appel lant ' s opening br ief . 
UTFC's reading of Section 29 as simply "to prevent the 
Sta te from act ing as s u r e t i e s for the bad debts of pr iva te 
businesses" i s far too narrow. I t s adoption would require the 
Court to read out of Section 29 the spec i f ic language prohibi t ing 
stock subscr ip t ion . I t would also require the Court to ignore 
the overwhelmingly clear evidence of the Framer fs i n t e n t . 
The quotat ions from the cons t i tu t iona l his tory c i ted by 
Respondents prove nothing more than the obvious: many 
expenditures of public money wil l in fact benefi t some 
e n t e r p r i s e s . Some of those are discussed in our opening br ief 
(pages 30-32). But i t can not be f a i r l y deduced e i the r from the 
language of Section 29 nor the h is tory of i t s passage, tha t the 
Framers meant to prohib i t only loans for p r iva te benefi t f while 
authorizing stock acqu is i t ions or d i rec t g i f t s . In the p la ines t 
poss ible language, Mr. Richards, a proponent/ s ta ted t h a t the 
Section was "intended to prohib i t the Sta te from subscribing to 
the capi ta l stock of any assoc ia t ion , corporation, or company." 
I Proceedings of the Otah Const i tut ional Convention of 1895 
("Proceedings") a t 890. Mr. Roberts c l a r i f i e d to the convention 
members tha t if the Section were not adopted "we shal l forever 
know tha t you are not only in favor of giving public moneys in 
aid of pr ivate en te rp r i ses f but you are also wi l l ing tha t the 
- 4 -
c r e d i t of t h e S t a t e s h o u l d be used i i i t h e same w a y . " T 
Proceedings - (emphasis supplied). 
"j J I i 'i in i tjii I 111 MI 11ni i. in I 11 ii I 1 I'm we 
o b j e c t e d t c ; : a n a l o g o u s t o t h e Utah I n n o v a t i o n F o u n d a t i o n , t h e 
p u b l i c / i iur -M r ' i . b r o a d - b a s e d , '- M d i n a t i n n e ' ; t v i'r.at- s e r v e s 
< comers , : ' 
t M r t a h I n n o v a t i o n F o u n d a t i o n . H--roovc t . . sa?.^ spee-j:- : -
v * - : e d t o u i e t e r m i n a l " . *.* -\r r i t f l r r ° ' * ] f - ,* ' ' i i 
i . :.< p t i \ ' i f e c o r p o r a t i o n s - i * , ;1 
t h a t ' ^ r u l a w M e 1 : 1MM p r o h i S . i t : v '1 P r o c e e d i n g . . 
A r ~ v ^ D • n • 
R o b e r t s 3 s ta temen* r e g a r d i n g *^^i .JL-C- vm- .. M ^ a was made by 
Hr ^ ~Mian, £c£ - P r o c e e d i n g s a- <>f0.4 ' i eov r , M a t t r i b u t e s 
i * : . H M t !. 
v.-,'* r. : t e s p o u s e . . " f rc : ^ t d t i i M :M - " v t :
 t.MM eodt . £ M: the 
s u g a r f a c t r ^ *i i M; ^ - ^ P | V P ( " ; - o o n * r i v e r s -J ru* rjt\
 r and 
f o r 1" -- ;•. M . • , "IAI 
s t a t e a s f o l l o w s : 
B U t f j am no t w i l l i n g evei i t h a t t h i s 
e n t e r p r i s e , l a u d a b l e a s 1 g r a n t you t h a t 
i t i s , s h o u l d be s u s t a i n e d and s u p p o r t e d 
a t t h e e x p e n s e of t h e p e o p l e of t h i s S t a t e , 
b e c a u s e , however l a u d a b l e t h i s e n t e r p r i s e 
migh t b e , i t i s v e r y l i k e l y , s i r , t h a t 
o t h e r companies w i l l form and o t h e r p r o j e c t s 
w i l l be i n n a u g u r a t e d which w i l l n o t be so 
l audab le - , and g e n t l e m e n e n g a g i n g i n them 
3
 The comment was made i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h c o n s i d e r a t i o n I 1.1K; 
p r o c e d u r a l q u e s t i o n of whe the r t h e s t a n d i n g r u l e of t h e 
c o n v e n t i o n r e q u i r e d t h a t e v e r y p r o p o s i t i o n or ciiiiendment no m a t t e r 
how s m a l l r e q u i r e d a m a j o r i t y v o t e . I P r o c e e d i n g s a t 959 . And 
t h e comment r e a f f i r m e d t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
p r o v i s i o n . 
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will not be moved by such patriotic 
sentiments as those that actuated this 
present company. I do not wish to take 
up the time of this Convention unprofitably, 
but, sir, you shall not find another 
question that will come before this Convention 
that is more important than the question as 
to whether there shall be any limitation 
put upon the power of the Legislature to 
tax the people. 
Id. at 92 4. He added in the same speech that the sugar factory 
gave "a very good illustration of the abuses that are apt to 
arise under the bounty." Xd. at 925. 
As developed in our opening brief (page 15) the root of 
the proponents1 concern was possible abuse of the power to tax, 
which the Constitution was conferring in the new state. The 
proponents regarded the taxing power as "the very highest 
expression of sovereign power." I Proceedings at 895 (Mr. 
Roberts). It was their conviction that it "has always been by 
that means that tyranny and oppression have been expressed." Xd. 
The specific concern which underlay their vigorous sponsorship of 
the predecessor of Section 29 was that if the power to tax was to 
be unlimited, then at the least the Legislature should be 
prohibited from using the tax moneys to assist private 
enterprise. Thus, they characterize their proposal as 
prohibiting "the taking of private money by the strong arm of the 
government for private uses." Id* at 923 (Mr. Roberts). 
The evil to be avoided—use of the taxing power for 
private benefit—occursf of coursef just as readily through 
equity investment or direct gifts as through loans. Mr. Richards 
announced that "no political subdivision of the state has a right 
to pledge its credit or to give publin money for any private 
-6-
e n t e r p r i s e r no matter what i t might b o , " I d . a t 9J4 ( emphas i s 
^uppLiecJ) '"" in I, p , 1 1 R o b e r t s was e q u a l l y emphatic in condemning 
what he regarded a s "equ iva len t Lu ..tri af f i ni iat iv r nf H e r i q h t of 
t h e L e g i s l a t u r e t o l o a n i t s c r e d i t , t o g r a n t b o u n t i e s , and t o 
.J utnoi; i z,e sufid'h ' ilrrions of t h e S t a t e t o loan t h e i r c r e d i t and t o 
pay bount ies : encouragement 
The Utah v o t e r * * «i-jecti<.r. * . * ru iriiorixss.. * : . U . J 
S> ,Liuiiai ; i ?• r^  * without t h a t 
r e j e c t : on t h e L e g i d d t u i * . * *.*. : ^e empo - i 
the s t a t e = fi* : n c i a ] r e s o u r c e s **: :, * ne * / t a h i i s h m e n t cc 
expand. r u^ 
submiss ion an. *: i c j c r n - : ~! . «- . i . e.., i i . i . - - - -
IT*- * " ; r : ' . f : in«V f <v S e c t i c v 2 9 . 
c o m p l i c a t e d type r i e a . \ i \ - . : : : i j j t e d i t , e Respondents . 
r
. * * understoo * s - I^=T" ;hc anguaqe 1:. *? 
ordinary mean,.,..- <u:,*.* t o have . i • i . y i n u s mpi i t r - . 
be 
ha fct :^ ^  frequently : epeated the standard tha* r avi-i. 
stake." Municipal Bldg. Autn. J X . ^ . . . , , ** . .. .. 
v-ih Adv. Re; . • : Eee a l s o , ca.>es d i s c u s s e d . 
standard 
t ,\at / xait:.: ., i th' complete ,^,.L.:^:. ;. text. so 
the oi ily standard that is consistent with the constitutional 
history. 
The proponents1 concern was tha t the government's 
taxing power not be "exercised in the promotion of pr ivate 
en te rpr i ses and to build up p r iva te fortunes" because tha t "makes 
i t possible for the powers of government to be so exercised tha t 
one c lass of the community may be made r ich at the expense of 
another port ion of the community." I Proceedings a t 895 (Mr. 
Rober ts) . The issue i s not whether tha t judgment i s good pol icy . 
The contro l l ing point i s tha t i t represents the very pos i t ion 
which prevailed a t the Const i tut ional Convention. 
This Court ' s standard tha t the s t a t e ' s f inanc ia l 
resources not be "at stake" i s completely fa i thful to the 
p r inc ip le tha t tax revenues—and therefore the tax power i tself— 
not be placed a t the disposal of p r iva te i n t e r e s t s . The 
Respondents' s tandard—dist inguishing between loans on the one 
hand and equity investments or g i f t s on the other—is not. 
None of the Utah cases c i ted by UTFC allowed the 
lending of the s t a t e ' s c red i t or subscr ipt ion to stocks in aid of 
pr iva te en t e rp r i s e . Those cases have largely been discussed in 
the opening brief f but some reply i s appropr ia te . 
In the early case of Bailey v. Van Dyke, 66 Utah 184, 
240 P. 454 (1925) the Court held t ha t there was no benefit a t a l l 
to pr ivate en te rp r i se where only education was being made 
ava i lab le to farmers. 
As a bas is for holding t h a t the water d i s t r i c t act was 
not unconst i tu t ional on i t s face, the Court in Lehi City v. 
Mailing, 87 Utah at 237, 48 P.2d 530 (1935) expressly assumed 
tha t if the d i s t r i c t were required to pay the obl iga t ion or 
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another d i s t r i c t i t would become the owner of unquestionably 
v a l u a b l e w a t e r r i g h t s ei i t in i p i n p e i t y foi whlnn if would have 
p a i d , and not ho r e q u i t e d to ,fp,J> Jul soinetLiii i IH< L I \\m hut 
ge t 1 J 1f J 1 r*» s a i t ( t h a I t h e ,t d m u;; t Oe r e a d i n 'T i e w v f J L s 
p u r p o s e ojf "aoqif M i iHn 1* vcl <>pi IUI .in I hiFiii ' j l w. i 'e i for p u b l i c 
b e n e f i t an., p a r t i c u l a r ^ *v L , , ^ 1 , 1 ^ «;. .u .. . , 87 
t - » * - * j K^ ; . t h a t t w o n a s t a y any 
a t t e m p ; : u j ^uhsc: ; ;oe for 
s t o c k * an/ ?' * p r o h i b i t e n , ivaif . - L . - C ;, pur a h1 
e 1 • - • , ; - • ' i a i" -
»~ * ess. -» A L-sfte 
«'• ' - / :)r-^if: i . . admonished tha1" J I * . . . o i l . 1. oi. «^« , / : e ; . . j ; 
' ^ u V e e n t e r p r i s e •;• ^ a i t ; «.'ul.» 
rt ',;. - , r.i ,.t . .urposei 
t h / r * w^M'-J r • <•:< T>rn : * /.in* p j D J i : inir.ic l u i *.XJH . u a n s 
v e n t u r e s . 
Cases f r ^ r o;':*-- j u r i s d i c t i o n s a r e of l i m i t e d r e l e v a n c e 
h e r e b e c a u s e t ; i - :* . ^ u i L u t i ^ r - ' I m c u a g e 
ar.d n i s t o r y . Moreover , none oJ t n e o t n e i s t a t e c a - . = . . .- -. / 
UTFC c^: w -••- .•-at'-:- , ^ - : .• o b l i g a t e the s t a t e 1 : :>:; - -
s u b s c r i b e In ,i.l u, L in , •- , ; 1 eiiLxty unuer a 
- 9 -
provision such as t ha t of Section 29 . 4 
Four of the seven c i ted cases involved schemes whereby 
the s t a t e was spec i f i ca l ly insulated from o b l i g a t i o n and payment 
was allowed only out of revenues of the pro jec t . California 
Housing Finance Agency v. E l l i o t t . 17 Cal.3d 575, 555 P.2d 1193 
(1976) (revenue bonds to finance housing); State ex r e L Amemiya 
v. Anderson. 56 Hawaii 566, 545 P.2d 1175 (1976) (revenue bonds 
to finance an t i -po l lu t ion p r o j e c t s ) ; Indus t r i a l Dev. Authority v. 
H£lfittHr 109 Ariz. 368, 509 P.2d 705 (1973) (revenue bonds to 
finance an t i -po l lu t i on p r o j e c t s ) ; Wisconsin Solid-Waste Recycling 
Authority v. Ear l , 70 Wis.2d 464, 235 N.W.2d 648 (1975) (bonds 
tha t could not become debts of the s t a t e to finance state-wide 
so l id waste and environmental c o n t r o l ) . 
One case involved s t a t e aid to a non-profi t hospi ta l 
under a cons t i tu t iona l provision t ha t spec i f i ca l ly allowed use of 
public c r ed i t for public purposes. Lake Otis Cl in ic . Inc . v. 
S t a t e . Alaska, 650 P.2d 388 (1982). And the other two cases 
involved cons t i tu t iona l provisions tha t make no pretension to 
prohib i t ing the lending of the s t a t e ' s c red i t in aid of p r iva te 
en t e rp r i s e . Char lo t t e sv i l l e v. DeHaan, Va., 323 S.E.2d 131 
(1984) (construing a cons t i tu t iona l provision spec i f i ca l ly added 
to allow aid to business after the previously ex is t ing 
4
 DTFC's reference a t page 7 of i t s brief to what other s t a t e s 
purportedly have done has no bearing on the requirements of 
Utah 's Const i tu t ion. And, even if the reference had included 
d e t a i l s of other s t a t e s ' programs—which i t did not—the 
reference would s t i l l not be useful here since i t i s not made in 
the context of cons t i tu t iona l construction by the courts of the 
appl icable j u r i s d i c t i o n s . 
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cons t i tu t iona l provision had been held to bar aid to p r iva te 
bus iness ) ; 5 Wilson v. Connecticut Product Development Corp., 167 
Conn. I l l , 355 A.2d 72 (1974). 
Wilson does not support a finding tha t UTPC1 s 
challenged a c t i v i t i e s are cons t i tu t iona l under § 29. The clause 
of the Connecticut Consti tut ion construed in Wilson provided tha t 
"no man or se t of men are e n t i t l e d to exclusive public 
emoluments.11 I d . a t 74. That i s a far cry from the 
cons t i tu t iona l provision involved here. 
Though the Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n Utah cons t i tu t iona l 
convention and Utah cases are the proper sources for 
adjudicat ion in t h i s case, i t i s observed, in con t rad i s t inc t ion 
to Wilson, tha t under a cons t i tu t iona l provision of another s t a t e 
tha t does prohibi t the lending of the s t a t e ' s c red i t to pr iva te 
individuals or e n t i t i e s , l e g i s l a t i o n has recently been s t r icken 
down. Reherman v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., Okla. , 679 P.2d 
1296 (1984). £e& aLaa, State y, Clay County Development 
Authority, Fla . f 140 So. 2d 576, 580 (1962) (financing 
arrangement an unconst i tut ional lending of the s t a t e ' s c red i t 
^ Respondent's footnote a t page 30 of i t s brief in which i t 
a l leges incorrectness of the Attorney General ' s statement i s 
misinformed. DeHaan was decided under a cons t i tu t iona l provision 
added af ter B u t t o n s , Day spec i f i ca l ly to allow aid to business: 
The Virginia Supreme Court held in the case 
of Button Y. Dayr 208 Va. 494, 158 S.E.2d 735 
(1968), tha t not only could the Commonwealth 
not d i rec t ly or ind i rec t ly aid a pr iva te 
purpose, i t could not es tab l i sh an author i ty 
to carry out such a purpose. The rule in 
tha t case was subsequently nu l l i f i ed by 
a cons t i tu t iona l amendment to § 10. 
Report of the Attorney General of Virginia a t 74 (1980). 
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where the purpose was "to promote the general development of the 
area by furnishing employment to the r e s i d e n t s . " 
D. Const i tut ional Supremacy 
The Const i tut ion c lea r ly removed from the realm of 
l e g i s l a t i v e author i ty the kind of power over public moneys which 
the UTIA authorizes UTFCf Venture Fund I f and Impetus Inc . to 
exerc i se . Yet, UTFC p e r s i s t s in advancing l e g i s l a t i v e purpose as 
sole j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the Act. The lengthy leg is la t ive-purpose 
statement in the Utah Product L i a b i l i t y Act did not prevent t h i s 
Court from concluding t ha t since the operative provisions of the 
Act were uncons t i tu t iona l , the Act was uncons t i tu t iona l . Berry 
v. Beech Aircraf t Corp., 29 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1985). Nor could a 
l e g i s l a t i v e purpose statement bind the Court without v io l a t i ng 
the fundamental p r inc ip le of j ud ic i a l review enunciated in 
Marbury v. Madison. 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). 
UTFC's public purpose argument must f a i l for at l e a s t 
three independently su f f i c ien t reasons. F i r s t , on i t s face i t i s 
an argument t h a t would render Section 29 meaningless, because the 
Legis la ture can always ident i fy publ ic purposes and s t a t e tha t i t 
ac ts in the public i n t e r e s t . Second, i t must be the purpose of 
the Legis la ture to do what i t does, and here what the Act in fac t 
does through i t s operat ive provisions i s to aid se lec ted , 
p r iva t e , high-tech business ventures with taxpayer money. Third, 
as already shown, t h i s was prec ise ly the kind of power to act "in 
the public i n t e r e s t " that our S t a t e ' s Const i tut ion Makers removed 
from the realm of l e g i s l a t i v e au thor i ty . 
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UTPC h a s r e f e r r e d t o men and women i n v o l v e d by UTFC. 
The q u a l i t y of t h e p e o p l e i n v o l v e d i s n o t i n q u e s t i o n ; n e i t h e r i s 
i t r e l e v a n t t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s . 6 
I I . 
SECTION 29 SHOULD BE INTERPRETED ACCORDING 
TO ITS TERMS IN ORDER TO AVOID REACHING OTHER 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
I t i s a p p a r e n t from t h e R e s p o n d e n t s 1 d i s c u s s i o n of t h e 
d e l e g a t i o n and p r i v a t e - c o r p o r a t i o n i s s u e s t h a t e a c h r a i s e s a 
s u b s t a n t i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l q u e s t i o n . I n t e r p r e t i n g S e c t i o n 29 t o 
mean what i t s a y s w i l l a v o i d t h e n e c e s s i t y of r e a c h i n g t h o s e 
a d d i t i o n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l q u e s t i o n s ; f o r r e a s o n s s t a t e d i n our 
o p e n i n g b r i e f (pages 27-30) t h a t a l o n e i s a n o t h e r r e a s o n t o r u l e 
i n t h e A p p e l l a n t ' s f a v o r on S e c t i o n 2 9 . 
We make o n l y one s u b s t a n t i v e r e s p o n s e t o R e s p o n d e n t s 1 
d e l e g a t i o n a r g u m e n t . On page 33 of t h e i r b r i e f R e s p o n d e n t s s t a t e 
t h a t " t h e Cour t h a s i n d e n t i f i e d f o u r ' e s s e n t i a l l e g i s l a t i v e 
f u n c t i o n s ' t h a t c a n n o t be t r a n s f e r r e d t o o t h e r s . " The f i r s t of t h e s e 
f o u r e s s e n t i a l f u n c t i o n s i s " t h e power t o impose t a x e s . . . . " I d . 
T h e o r e t i c a l l y and o p e r a t i o n a l l y f the power to spend is the 
constitutional twin of the power to tax. One involves how public 
moneys are obtained, and the other how they are used. Surely, the 
6
 "We need not necessarily agree with Lord Acton that great men 
are almost always bad men; but our constitutional law should 
clearly be based upon some such assumption. Indeed, the whole 
organic structure has been erected upon the assumption that the 
king not only is capable of doing wrong but is more likely to do 
wrong than other men if he is given the opportunity." 1 B. 
Schwartz, A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States 
20 (1963). 
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s p e n d i n g power i s j u s t a s much an e s s e n t i a l l e g i s l a t i v e f u n c t i o n 
which t h e L e g i s l a t u r e c a n n o t t r a n s f e r t o o t h e r s a s i s t h e t a x i n g 
power . S u r e l y , i f t h e "power of a p r o f e s s i o n t o s e t minimum p r i c e s 
f o r s e r v i c e s of i t s members" ( I d . ) b e l o n g s on t h e n o n - d e l e g a b l e l i s t 
of e s s e n t i a l l e g i s l a t i v e f u n c t i o n s , so does t h e power t o d e t e r m i n e 
how t h e p u b l i c 1 s money w i l l be s p e n t . 
I I I . 
UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL HAS THE RIGHT AND DUTY TO BE UTFC' S 
LEGAL COUNSEL 
Taken a s a w h o l e , t h e e x e c u t i v e - b r a n c h c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
of UTFC and i t s r e l i a n c e on s t a t e f i n a n c i n g e s t a b l i s h UTFC a s an 
agency w i t h i n t h e E x e c u t i v e b r a n c h of government s u b j e c t t o t h e 
d i r e c t i o n of S t a t e o f f i c e r s . See A p p e l l a n t ' s o p e n i n g b r i e f , 
p a g e s 3 2 - 3 6 . Hence, under A r t i c l e V I I , S e c t i o n 1 6 , UTFC i s t h e 
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c l i e n t . 
As a b a s i s f o r i t s c l a i m t h a t i t may h i r e i n d e p e n d e n t 
c o u n s e l , R e s p o n d e n t s a r g u e t h a t UTFC h a s t h e same s t r u c t u r a l 
i n d e p e n d e n c e which t h e e n t i t i e s i n Hansen v . S t a t e R e t i r e m e n t 
B o a r d , U t a h , 652 P .2d 1332 (1982) we re found t o h a v e . UTFC does 
n o t have t h a t i n d e p e n d e n c e . 
The i n d e p e n d e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e Utah S t a t e 
R e t i r e m e n t Board and T r u s t Fund, a n a l y z e d i n Hansen r c o n t r a s t 
s h a r p l y w i t h t h e d e p e n d e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of UTFC. The 
R e t i r e m e n t Board a d m i n i s t e r s a number of r e t i r e m e n t s y s t e m s 
t h r o u g h a common t r u s t fund s o l e l y for t h e b e n e f i t of t h e 
b e n e f i c i a r i e s and n o t f o r t h e p u b l i c a t l a r g e . "No s t a t e f u n d s 
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are appropriated to meet any adminis t rat ive c o s t s . " £d. at 1338. 
And legal fees are iden t i f i ed as part of the adminis t rat ive costs 
not borne by the s t a t e . 
This Court ' s ru l ing with regard to the Indus t r ia l 
Commission was based on a finding tha t the Commission was "an 
adminis t ra t ive agency . . . with adminis t ra t ive , quas i - jud ic ia l 
and q u a s i - l e g i s l a t i v e powers," and hence "not a body within the 
executive branch of government." Xd^  Here, UTFC does not have 
those c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , and, as found by the D i s t r i c t Court, i t i £ 
"within the executive branch of government." Memorandum 
Decision^ page 13, R. AG act ion 38. Moreover, the work of the 
Indus t r ia l Commission was found in Hansen to be " t c ] lose ly 
associa ted with" the State Insurance Fund " t a l l l adminis t ra t ive 
costs of [which] are borne by the Fund i t s e l f , including 
a t t o r n e y ' s f ees . " I d . a t 1339. The Court also observed that for 
the Indus t r ia l Commission, "there i s a ' spec ia l fund separate and 
apart from a l l public moneys or funds of t h i s s t a t e . ' " I d . at 
1139. 
Multiple indices of independence supported the Court ' s 
conclusion that the University of Utah Medical Center Trust? was 
outside the cons t i tu t iona l requirement of Attorney General 
representa t ion . The Trust was es tabl ished by the University of 
Utah "which enjoys a degree of cons t i t u t i ona l ly rooted 
independence, [and] i s not an executive department agency." I d . 
at 1340. No s t a t e funds are appropriated to the Trust ; no s t a t e 
funds are used for a t to rneys ' fees . I d . 
7
 The Trust was the real party in i n t e r e s t in Hansen, not the 
University or the Medical Center. Hansen, a t 1340. 
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In Hansen* "tnlone of the defendant agencies [was] an 
executive department agency." Xd. In the instant casef by 
contrast, the District Court has correctly found that UTFC is an 
executive department agency.8 Reliance on state moneys and 
payment of attorneys1 fees from those moneys were central 
considerations in Hansen. Here, UTFC relies entirely or almost 
entirely on state-appropriated moneys which are held before 
expenditure by the State Treasurer as public moneys. From those 
state moneys it pays the fees of its attorneys. The rationale 
employed by the Court in Hansen requires the conclusion that the 
Attorney General is UTFC's constitutional counsel. 
DTFC argues it is "independent" for purposes of 
exemption from constitutional requirements simply because the 
Legislature applied that term to it. The Court in Hansen did not 
thoughtlessly accept the legislative label. It applied an 
objective analysis to determine whether each entity in question 
relied on state funds and used those state funds to pay counsel, 
and whether it was under State officer supervision. That 
analysis here requires a conclusion that the Attorney General is 
UTFCfs proper counsel. 
8
 The elements that reflect supervision of UTFC by Article VII 
State officers are shown in our opening brief at pages 35-36. 
Because of the mandate of Article V, Section 1 of the Utah 
Constitution it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that UTFC, 
simply as an exerciser of governmental powers, must be within the 
Executive department. Article V, Section 1 provides in pertinent 
part: "The powers of government of the State of Utah shall be 
divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the 
Executive, and the Judicial . . . ." (emphasis supplied). 
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If indeed UTPC had independence or " f l e x i b i l i t y " to the 
extent i t s brief claims for i t , i t would be in v io l a t ion of the 
cons t i tu t iona l provisions t h a t bar delegation of l e g i s l a t i v e 
powers and creat ion of corporations by special a c t s . 
Respondents take " f l e x i b i l i t y " to mean l i c e n s e . UTFC's 
l i cense to e x i s t independent of cons t i tu t iona l cons t ra in t s and to 
h i re i t s own counsel led to the inconsis tent advice and dual 
lawsui ts described in the Appellant1s opening br ie f . That 
l icense f a c i l i t a t e d conf l i c t s of i n t e r e s t . See Appendix Df 
Appel lant ' s opening br ief . That l i cense accommodated v io l a t ions 
of many cons t i tu t iona l and s t a tu to ry provisions before UTFC was 
extended pardoning s ta tu tory exemptions.9 That l i cense fostered 
the v io l a t i ons of the Treasurer ' s cons t i tu t iona l custodial 
powers, the cons t i tu t iona l separation-of-powers requirement, and 
the Open and Public Meetings law, which were corrected by the 
court below. 
That l icense runs counter to the advice given by 
Ju s t i c e Moffat in his concurring1 0 opinion in Chez v. Indus t r i a l 
Commission of Utah, 90 Utah 447, 458, 62 P.2d 549, 554, (1936): 
Sta te agencies are for the purpose of 
doing s t a t e business. If the Legis la ture may 
create some f loat ing en t i t y without ancest ry , 
se t i t going as an orphan i n s t i t u t i o n under 
the adminis t rat ion of a s t a te -c rea ted board, 
y
 R. UTFC act ion , 316-17 (v io l a t ions ) ; S.B. No. 1 of the June 
1985 Special Session and S.B. No. 254 of the 1986 General Session 
(exemptions). 
I " Jus t i ce Moffat's opinion i s erroneously designated as a 
d issent ing opinion in the Utah Reports, but i t i s ac tua l ly a 
concurring opinion joined in by Jus t ice Ephraim Hanson, reaching 
the same r e s u l t as the t h r e e - j u s t i c e majority opinion. 
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agency, commission, or what no t , a c t i n g for 
and on behalf of the s t a t e , and t h a t agency 
may do t h i n g s under a l e g i s l a t i v e enactment 
which the L e g i s l a t u r e i s p r o h i b i t e d from 
enac t ing under the l i m i t a t i o n s of the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n , the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n s 
or p r o h i b i t i o n s or mandates become easy of 
evasion and t h e i r e x i s t e n c e a mere ma t t e r of 
words t o be ignored or d i s r ega rded whenever 
the d e s i r e t o accomplish a given purpose may 
sugges t a convenient p rocedure . 
UTFC's independence i s denied by the purse s t r i n g s t h a t 
a t t a c h i t t o t h e t a x - p a y e r s of t he S t a t e of Utah. I t s 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s show i t to be w i t h i n the supe rv i so ry con t ro l of 
S t a t e o f f i c e r s . The A c t ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of UTFC as 
" independent" and i t s a u t h o r i z a t i o n of independent counsel for 
UTFC must y i e l d t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l mandate of A r t i c l e V I I , 
Sec t ion 16, in the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . 
CONCLUSION 
The UTIA a u t h o r i z e s the S t a t e ' s f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s t o 
be put a t s t ake and a c t u a l l y given in d i r e c t a i d of p r i v a t e , 
h i g h - r i s k , h igh- technology bus ine s s v e n t u r e s , i n v i o l a t i o n of 
A r t i c l e VI, Sec t ion 29 . I t a l so impermiss ib ly blocks t h e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t and duty of the At torney General to be 
UTFC's l e g a l counse l . This case does not revolve around t h e 
c u r r e n t L e g i s l a t u r e ' s economic p o l i c y . I t c e n t e r s on the 
i n t e g r i t y of t h e Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n . 
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s judgment on the i n s t a n t i s s u e s 
should be r e v e r s e d . Judgment in favor of t he At torney General 
should be g r a n t e d . 
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DATED th is 30 A day of April, 1986. 
REX t . LEE 
Special Assistant Attorney 
General 
RALPH L.'FINLAYSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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